In the eyes of millions, a much-admired underdog withstood heroically, evcn miracnlomly in June of 1067, thc threat of annihilation from thc giant military menilce of the combincd Arab armies.'
The challenge to this myth began with a speech by I~C S C~V C Gcncral Xlatituih I'elcd. The fact that thcre was no real dilnger of destruction, Pclcd silid, caused more difficulty for the government, which had adopted the "diaspora approach," according to which war can be justified only when thcrc is a threat of extcrmination and not merely for political reasons. Actually the war wos caused, he stilted, by the Sovict Union's attempt to changc the status quo in the area and to supplant the Amerkiln settlement, which had prevailed since 1957, gling to preserve our own existence in the face of impending extermination." General Peled made clear that he was aware of the threats of Arab leaders which had an influence on the opinions of promincnt Israelis. Rut, he pointed out, "it is well known that thc Arab leaders thcmselves were awarc of their impotence and did not believe in their own threats." And further:
I am convinced that our General Staff never told the government [of Levi Eshkol] that therc was any substance to thc Egyptian military threat to Israel, or that we were not capable of crushing Nasscr's army which had exposed itself, with unprccedented foolishness, to the devastating strikes of our forces. All those stories about the huge danger we were facing because of our small tcnitorial size, an argument expounded once the war was over, had never been considered in our calculations prior to the unleashing of hostilities. Whilc we proceeded towards the full mo1)ilization of our forces, no person in his right mind could belicve that all this force was necessary for our "defencc" against thc Egyptian threat. This force was necessary to crush once and for all the Egyptians, at the military level, and the Soviet masters, at the political level. Thus the controversy sparked by General Pelcd spread. The discussion raiscs the question: If, as he claims, there was no danger of Israel's being destroyed, why did he agree with the Israeli decision to launch the attack in June, 19677 Gcncral Peled, who has a reputation for being proAmerican and anti-Soviet, favored war against Egypt in 1967, not in order to defend Israel's existence, but to give credibility to Israel's power of dissuasion. Israel had insisted from 1957 that a blockade of the Straits of Tiran would be considercd a casus belli. So, General Peled felt, Israel had to act militarily in 1967, when the Straits were closed, to prevent Nasser and the Russians from changing the status quo in the region.
Why did General Peled make his declarations in March, 1972? Kapeliuk has no doubt that Peled had a political objective in mind, that in his opposition to I s r i~l i annexation of the territorics occupied in 1967 he wanted to show that the government was explniting the fcelings of fear in the population to further its expansionist aims. General Peled maintained that the Israeli lcnders had dcliberately distorted the objectives of the June war in order to raise the spurious issue of the security of the state. The only conclusion onc can draw, Pcled wrote, is that "by falsifying the causcs of the war and confusing its true motivations, the Israeli govcmment was seeking to render acceptable to the people the principle of partial or total annexation." Hc accused the government of stirring up in the people an irrational fear for their existence.
General We are assuming that we should wage war only to prevent extermination. This is the diaspora approach, he says; it is based on a false assumption. Rather, hc states categorically, a state does not go to war only when thc immediate threat of destruction is hanging over it. At issue, he notes, is not our physical sccurity but the rcalization of our historical and national interests, our Zionist principles. The western regions of "Eretz Israel," that is, thc West Bank, belong to the essence of Zionism, and without them the Jewish state does not constitute an historical wholeness.
Why, then, General Weizman asks, were people afraid in 19677 He answers that the fear was duc to the "loss of cool" on the part of the Israeli leadership, its lack of self-confidence of an historical consciousness, of its Zionist mission. The leadership was thinking, instead, that it might fight solely to be secure against extermination. The people regained their morale and self-confidence, General Weizman explained, with the formation of the united national government and the joining it of Messrs. Begin and Dayan. For the future, Weizman states, we shall have no "wayward policy" that answers problems concerning only the body of our nation and not the things of the soul. Rather, if we are obliged to go to war again, he says, we will know that we are not fighting to survive but to be able to continue living here as we wish. General Arik Sharon, presently commander for the Sinai region, affirmed that there was a danger of annihilation ("the aim of the 1967 war was to prevent destruction of the pcople"), while Menahim Begin denies such a danger. On June 11 the newspaper presented a discussion of the issue by a group of teachers; now that we have discovered that there really was no threat of destruction, they say, we want to know why the government lied to us.
On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the war . . . thc govcmment asccrtaincd that the a m i & of Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate-multifront aggression threatening thc very cxistencc of the state. The government resolves to take military action to liberate Israel from thc stranglehold of aggression which is progressively being tightened around Isracl.7
Thc rcsolution further provided that the Prime Minister and the Defcnse Minister be authorized "to confirm to the general staff the time for action," and that the Foreign Ministry be charged with the task "of exhausting all possibilities of political action in order to explain Israel's stand and to obtain support from the powers."
The publication of this decision of the 1967 Cabinet may well have been intended to put an end to the public debate on the question, according to thc Jerusalem Post, since its continuance would involve thc "leaking" of security information, "as the debaters struggle to prove their case." The newspaper Daoar expressed the hope that thc publication of the 1967 Cabinet decision "will put an end to the barren argument."
Was there, then, a real threat of annihilation of Israel in 1967? Thc answcr is clearly no. The number and stature of the Israeli generals who havc spoken out, the clarity and cxplicitncss of their statements, the glare of publicity surrounding the debate which would have brought out any weaknesses in these generals' arguments, the fact that a "dove" like Gcnera1 Pelcd and a "hawk" like General Wcizman, who differ on the future of the occupicd territories, concur on the central issue of the controvcrsy-all these considerations make the answer emphatically clcar.
Therc are, moreover, several clemcnts which weaken the case of those who affirm that in 1967 a dangcr of annihilation did exist-the "establishment" connections of most of these persons, the dutifulness of their denials and the appcal to the generals who spoke out to refrain from further discussion lcst Israel's imagc bc adversely affected.
A would not h a w becn enough to unlcash an offcnsivc against Israel. He knew it and we knew it."" In this interview Rabin gave no indication whatever of a fear of annihilation of Israelis; on the contrary, the wholc tenor of his remarks goes against such a fear. Whcn Eric Rouleau pressed thc significant objcction-sincc the partial blockade of Akaba did not constitute a qucstion of lifc or death for Israel (which could get supplies through Hnifa as it did before 1956) and Nasser was prcpared to make conccssions concerning tlic passage, espccially for petrol, why, tlicn, did you unleash hostilities only forty-eight hours hefore the arrival in Washington of Zaknria \luhidin, who wcnt there precisely to negotiatc! a settlcmcnt?-General Rabin rcplicd: "Thc closing of the Gulf of Akaba in itse!f, I repect, was for us a cusus belh. However 
